Moral versus Market Economies in the Post-Soviet Firm
Not without cause, some late Soviet-era reformers believed hypercentralization and micro-management were partly responsible for economic inefficiencies. Enterprise managers and employees did not disagree. To them, the problem was not the enterprise itself; certainly outdated or worn technology hurt, but the real obstacle to productivity was bureaucrats to whom they answered and whose Plan-centered rules stifled innovation and productivity. As several assistant managers of a lathe-making firm told me in 1995, they knew much of their output was unnecessary and that monthly Plan targets were not "rational."
In the Soviet production model, economic output depended primarily on sheer numbers of workers-but this model reached diminishing returns. Further, the Soviet Union faced a renewed arms race involving new levels of technology, East Asian economies driven by modern technologies and techniques, and dependency on petrodollars that the oil glut of the 1980s revealed. In this context, some reformers in ministries and around Gorbachev came to see that liberalizing enterprise relations and decentralizing decision-making to managers and even industrial workers would inject needed dynamism into production against sclerosis and stagnation. While Gorbachev's regime did not entirely liberate enterprises-they remained state property, although the state was a de facto silent partner most of the time-autonomy given was supposed to raise productivity with a carrot and a stick. The carrot was the chance to earn better wages from innovation and efficiency gains; the stick was financial accountability for inefficiency (lower income and wages). This was the essence of markets: give economic actors themselves the chance to make decisions, reap rewards, or pay for failures.
The story seemed fairly straightforward at first. Criticisms of the Plan and state subsidies were well known: between dictation of monthly Plan targets and other indicators and the inability of enterprises to retain and distribute gains from production, there were few material incentives for workers or managers to be efficient and productive or to produce real, useful output instead of the usual wasteful or fictitious output. Reformers and managers alike were aware of the shadow economy and nalevo work (informal work on the side, even in the shadows of legality). Giving enterprises opportunity for independent work after fulfilling state purchases might tap into potential shadow economy profits for general use and investment. This worked if two conditions held. First, so long as the logics and policies of moral and market corresponded, market or even quasi-market reforms would generate some support from managers and employees. Second, as long as reforms were "market" but not "capitalist," the restructuring project would not raise resistance from below. "Market" connoted autonomous decision-making vis-à-vis production and exchange; the "market" was liberating. "Capitalism" connoted property ownership, thus authority of private owners rather than the state. The possibility of employee ownership could mitigate this, and employee ownership was important in the first stages of restructuring and privatization; but the risk of centralized external ownership remained. In 1988 and 1989, both market and moral economies had enough overlap to make enterprise restructuring palatable within Soviet enterprises. By late 1991 and into 1992, the marriage of the two was strained to the point of divorce. The restructuring experience created practical problems increasingly difficult to solve.
The politics of enterprise reform
In the end, enterprise restructuring was more than technical changes or managerial rent-seeking or theft (Djankov 1999; Kotkin 2001) . Restructuring the late Soviet and post-Soviet enterprise was a political project of remaking overall authority, meaning, and legitimacy of production and organization (Burawoy and Hendley 1992; Hass 1999) . Normally, organizational change is not viewed through the prism of political sociology or political science because hierarchy and authority are taken for granted, with "resistance" little more than occasional grumbling or the equivalent of water-cooler intrigue; certainly important scholarship in organizational change (e.g. Chandler 1977 (e.g. Chandler , 1994 DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Dobbin 2009 ) says little on systemic conflict inside organizations because they do not consider that firms can also be akin to lower-level fields and polities. To understand the confused and contentious nature of late Soviet and post-Soviet enterprise change, we must take seriously
